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Abstract 
Against the background of demographic decline and growing economic competitiveness from emerging economies, 
this  Policy  Brief  looks  into  the  potential  benefits  of  increased  intra-EU  labour  mobility.  On  the  basis  of  an 
examination of the ‘German case’ on EU labour mobility. It proposes ideas on how to better foster a European fair 
deal on talent, one that would benefit the EU as a whole. It concludes with a proposal on how to increase the 
potential benefits of the freedom of movement. 
 
Introduction 
EU  citizens’  freedom  of  movement  across 
national borders in the European Union is one of 
its  fundamental principles. Cross-border  labour 
mobility  of  EU  nationals  not  only  promotes 
European integration and social cohesion, but it 
also boosts the overall economic potential of the 
EU.  The  vision  of  borderless  mobility  for  EU 
citizens, which has become a legal reality in the 
EU *,  was  designed  to  build  an  economically 
robust and free European Union. Regarding the 
working-aged  population,  a  pool  of  ‘unbound’ 
human  capital  has  the  potential  to  counteract 
economic  imbalances  through  self-determined 
mobility of jobseekers to regions in which labour 
demand cannot be met locally.  
                                                   
* Bulgaria  and  Romania  still  face  restrictions  vis-à-vis 
some of the EU-25 member states which will be lifted in 
January 2014 while the same applies to newly acceded 
Croatia in 2015. 
An economic space without mobility barriers is, 
in theory, good medicine for an EU that has large 
variations  in  unemployment  and  economic 
performance. But labour mobility within the EU 
is responding slowly to market forces. According 
to Eurostat and based on the European Labour 
Force Survey, in 2012, just 6.6 million workers in 
the EU27 were citizens from another EU member 
state.  This  equates  to  roughly  2%  of  the  total 
working age population (15 to 64 year olds) and 
1.3%  of  the  overall  population  of  the  EU27  in 
2012.  Of  the  15.2  million  foreign  citizens  that 
worked  in  the  EU27  in  the  same  year  and 
accounted  for  7%  of  total  employment,  6.6 
million  were  intra-EU  labour  migrants.  These 
intra-EU labour migrants represented 3% of total 
employment.  Regardless  of  which  comparison 
you make, the conclusion is the same: intra-EU 
labour mobility remains an exceptional case The 
lack  of  intra-EU  labour  mobility  has  severe 
economic  consequences.  The  European  Council 
estimated the economic loss due to inactivity or 2 | BUSSE & MOREHOUSE 
 
unemployment  of  young  people  to  be  €153 
billion in 2011, or roughly 1.2% of the EU’s GDP. 
Intra-EU labour mobility is expected to grow in 
the  absence  of  legal  barriers,  driven  by  an 
increasingly  cultural  and  linguistically  versatile 
youth  in  search  of  unequally  distributed,  and 
constantly  shifting  life  opportunities.  Some 
corridors  of  advanced  mobility  are  arising  and 
defying the dominant aggregate tendency not to 
move  to  a  foreign  EU  country.  Yet  when 
compared with the percentage of the aggregate 
international  migrant  population  on  the  move, 
which  is  just  over  3  percent  of  the  world 
population,  intra-EU  mobility  appears 
underwhelming,  especially  considering  that  the 
vast  majority  of  international  migrants  must 
overcome  legal  barriers,  face  greater  financial 
burdens  to  move,  have  fewer  rights  and 
protections upon arrival abroad and must often 
bridge  vaster  distances  to  live  abroad.  Hence 
unblocking the lifeline of intra-EU talent must go 
beyond the creation of a legal framework for free 
movement. 
For  a  Union  that  rests  on  the  principle  of  free 
movement,  the  EU  has  exhibited  extremely 
contradictory  ‘body  language’  in  making  this 
concept a reality. EU member states have reacted 
to  intra-EU  mobility  with  varied  openness  in 
recent  years.  Germany  began  by  limiting 
mobility and delaying it as much as regulation 
would allow. But the country has since evolved 
into a “willing hub” for mobile EU workers. The 
United  Kingdom  was  a  pioneer  in  opening  its 
labour markets to intra-EU labour migrants. Yet 
it has since implemented rhetoric and explored 
policies  to  reverse  its  long-standing 
attractiveness  as  a  destination  for  mobile  EU 
workers, with its Prime Minister recently calling 
for  mechanisms  to  limit  EU  mobility  that  is 
economically  disadvantageous  for  countries  of 
destination.  Spain  meanwhile  has  reversed  its 
“polarity” in recent years regarding the flow of 
migrants,  including  mobile  EU  workers.  It  has 
gone  from  being  a  destination  to  becoming  a 
source  country  for  mobile  EU  labour.  This  has 
happened  more  or  less  involuntarily  as  the 
economic  downturn,  rather  than  policy  has 
pulled and pushed vast population flows across 
Spanish borders and through its labour market. 
Both  the  potential  success  and  failure  of 
enhanced  intra-EU  labour  mobility  has  been  a 
concern  for  policymakers.  When  EU  mobility 
occurs,  critics  express  concern  for  brain  drain. 
When  it  does  not  occur  enough  to  fill  labour 
shortages in tune with business cycles, and at a 
scale  to  alleviate  high  unemployment  levels  in 
certain regions, critics express concern for brain 
waste.  The  aggregate  ambivalence  in  the  EU 
surrounding the fear of movement and the fear 
of non-movement must be resolved in social and 
political consensus, if EU mobility is to become a 
reality,  strength  and  regional  comparative 
advantage of the European Union. 
Against  the  background  of  looming 
demographic  decline,  the  baby  boomer 
generation exits from European labour markets, 
and  growing  economic  competitiveness  from 
emerging economies, this Policy Brief looks into 
the  potential  of  increased  intra-EU  labour 
mobility.  This  policy  brief  will  examine  the 
“German case” on EU labour mobility, digging 
below  the  surface  of  what  aggregate  data 
suggests is occurring in this regard. It proposes 
ideas on how to better foster a European fair deal 
on  talent,  one  that  would  benefit  the  EU  as  a 
whole.  It  concludes  with  policy 
recommendations  on  how  to  increase  the 
potential  benefits  of  the  freedom  of  movement 
for both individual EU citizens and for the EU as 
a whole. 
1.  Intra-EU labour mobility: the 
German bubble? 
On  the  surface,  Germany  is  a  magnet  for 
newcomers, especially those from EU countries. 
In 2012 nearly one million non-German citizens 
(966,000  persons)  migrated  to  Germany,  a 
country of 80.5 million people, according to the 
German  Federal  Office  for  Statistics.  The  vast 
majority  of  newcomers  were  nationals  of  EU 
member states. Migration from EU countries to 
Germany  consists  predominately  of  working 
aged persons. 
Yet  evidence  suggests  that  the  country  is 
struggling  to  steadily  attract  and  retain 
international talent. Three factors lend evidence 
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boom  in  Germany  may  instead  be  a  “mobility 
bubble”. 
The first factor is the large scope of emigration 
that accompanies significant inflows: Germany is 
both  pulling  in  newcomers  and  shedding  a 
considerable  number  of  international  migrants 
simultaneously.  According  to  the  German 
Federal  Statistics  Office,  in  2012  579,000  non-
Germans left the country, putting net migration 
to Germany at: 387,000 non-German newcomers. 
The  country  is  one  in  extreme  fluctuation 
regarding  its  internationally mobile  population, 
and this trend has continued in 2013 leading the 
German Federal Office for Statistics to conclude 
that the high volume of simultaneous in and out 
migration makes it unclear if immigrants’ plans 
to stay in the country long-term. Indeed, only a 
few  years  ago,  Germany  was  a  country  of  net 
emigration. 
Figure 1. Net Migration from the EU to Germany by 
age 2012 
 
Source: Destatis (German Statistical Office), 2013. 
Figure 2. Net migration of non-German citizens to 
Germany 2012 
 
Source: Destatis (German Statistical Office), 2013. 
The  second  factor  is  the  national  method  for 
counting  annual  migration  flows:  German  data 
include a significant number of persons that do 
not  fit  the  UN  international  standard  (and 
accepted  EU  terminology)  for  defining  an 
international migrant. This is because the figures 
reported by the German Federal Statistics Office 
include persons who stay in the country for less 
than one year. If we apply the UN definition of 
“migrant” to the German data set, according to 
the Federal Office for Migration and Asylum, the 
number of migrants deflates to just half of total 
flows of non-nationals across German borders. 
Third,  are  the  considerable  push  (rather  than 
pull)  factors  driving  migration  to  Germany:  In 
2009  net  EU  migration  to  Germany  was  18,000 
soaring to almost 100,000 in 2010, doubling the 
year after and reaching 275,000 persons in 2012. 
This  has  occurred  in  parallel  to  austerity 
measures  in  many  countries  and  the  lifting  of 
free labour movement barriers for the eight EU-
accession-countries  in  the  East.  Unsurprisingly, 
the  main  countries  of  origin  of  newcomers  to 
Germany  have  been  Eastern  and  Southern 
European states. 
Figure 3. Net migration of non-Germans to Germany 
by country of origin 2012 
 
Source: Destatis (German Statistical Office), 2013. 
With countries such as Ireland, Italy, and Spain 
becoming less attractive to mobile talent amidst 
uncertain  economic  times,  Germany  may  be 
profiting from the “negative magnetism” of other 
countries.  With  significant  wage  differentials, 
unemployment levels and economic forecasts in 
the  EU,  the  modest  scope  of  EU mobility  from 
southern Europe to Germany demonstrates that 
the  lifeline  of  talent  in  the  EU  is  clogged.  The 
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country  is  likely  in  the  midst  of  a  mobility 
bubble. 
2.  A European Fair Deal on Talent 
Europe as a whole will be the first continent to 
enter a peaceful, managed demographic decline 
around  2040.  The  EU  must  urgently  develop 
strategies for fostering EU mobility and create a 
fair deal on talent within the European Union. 
A “European fair deal on talent” strategy could 
bridge  the  divide  between  mobility  opponents 
who  fear  brain  drain  even  when  idle  talent 
moves away, and mobility proponents who warn 
of brain waste when talent stays put at the price 
of unemployment. It could amplify the benefits 
of brain gain and brain circulation.  
Figure 4. Youth unemployment rate in select EU 
countries 2003-2012 
 
Source: Eurostat 2013. 
Furthermore,  it  could  contribute  positively  to 
increasing  the  EU’s  economic  competitiveness 
and  economic  rebalancing  of  the  EU.  In  the 
short-term,  the  core  argument  for  increasing 
mobility is to reduce (youth) unemployment in 
the  EU  while  at  the  same  time  addressing 
emerging labour shortages in other EU countries 
through  the  mobility  of  workers.  Especially 
youth  unemployment  rates  in  the  EU  have 
strongly diverged following the global financial 
crisis.  Whereas  Germany,  Austria  and  the 
Netherlands  have  relatively  low  youth 
unemployment  rates,  these  rates  have  all  but 
exploded  in  southern  Europe.  Youth 
unemployment rates (15-24 year olds) in Greece 
and  Spain  exceeded  50%  in  2012.  Here  it  is 
important to note that the youth unemployment 
rate has limitations as a metric because it doesn’t 
adequately  consider  those  young  people  in 
education in training. 
A  European  fair  deal  on  talent  would  enable 
countries  losing  talent  to  better  develop  their 
future  domestic  talent  pipeline  and  to  combat 
unemployment.  In  cases  where  this  talent  is 
employed and benefitting another EU country, a 
“talent mobility stabilizer” mechanism could be 
created by EU member states in the short-term. 
Accordingly, the talent-lending country (that has 
substantially invested in and matured domestic 
talent)  could  receive  a  “talent  investment 
package” to grow its future domestic talent pool 
and  improve  employment  prospects  at  home. 
Such  an  initiative  could  be  referred  to  as  a 
European fair deal on talent. 
Figure 5. Talent mobility stabilizer 
 
The  temporary  talent  mobility  stabilizer  would 
consist of an economic package administered at 
the EU level. In accordance with benchmarks, EU 
countries that are net beneficiaries of talent could 
target  investment  at  EU  countries  that  “lend” 
domestically grown talent to their neighbours, in 
the short- term. Such an economic package could 
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be ring fenced to benefit government programs, 
as  well  as  a  public  private  partnerships  that 
develop  the  talent  pipeline  and  reduce 
unemployment such as investment in education, 
training,  lifelong  learning  and  skills  matching 
initiatives  (that  match  job  seekers  with 
employment  opportunities).  This  additional 
investment in talent should not replace national 
spending but complement it, increasing the total 
investment  of  talent  lending  countries  in  key 
areas of growth and talent. 
Such a mechanism would have to be discussed 
and  developed  among  EU  member  states.  This 
policy  brief  offers  a  few  contours  of  how  the 
mechanism  could  take  shape.  A  European  fair 
deal on talent could for example, be governed by 
indicators such as: 
  flows  of  intra-EU  mobility  and  specifically 
intra-EU labour mobility,  
  scope of employment of EU nationals in other 
EU countries,  
  overall  unemployment  and  youth 
unemployment  levels  in  countries  lending 
talent 
  macroeconomic  growth  indicators  and 
projections. 
The  collection  of  benchmarks  could  include  an 
indicator on unemployment rates among mobile 
EU citizens, in order to raise awareness among 
EU member states should large-scale movements 
of  EU  citizens  result  in  unemployment,  rather 
than employment. The talent investment package 
could  be  included  as  a  component  in  the  next 
multi-year portfolio of the EU Commission and 
in  its  corresponding  budget  during  its  next 
legislative  period  or  it  could  be  created  as  a 
short-term, stand-alone fund at the EU level and 
be piloted initially. 
Beyond forming an evidence base for the “talent 
mobility  stabilizer”,  the  indicators  can  improve 
our  understanding  of  organically  evolving 
mobility  trends.  Through  this  improved 
knowledge, existing programs designed to foster 
mobility  could  be  fine-tuned.  New  mobility, 
training  and  skills  matching  initiatives  could 
emerge from this evidence base. Currently, data 
on  EU  labour  mobility  exists,  but  it  is  not 
compiled and reported in a way that allows for 
easy  access  and  evaluation.  Additionally,  skills 
matching mechanisms are currently undergoing 
heavy  investment  at  all  levels  of  governance. 
From the European, government driven EURES 
project,  to  local  companies  placing  job  adds  in 
other EU member state’s media, the race to find 
well-functioning  skills  matching  methods  is 
underway. 
Increased EU mobility is an important short-term 
strategy  to  reducing  both  talent  gaps  and 
unemployment.  Yet  the  EU’s  demographic 
challenge will exhaust its internal human capital 
resources before mid-century. In the medium to 
long term, the ingredients for a fair deal on talent 
in  Europe  will shift  dramatically,  to  outside  its 
borders. As the continent builds a demographic 
“roof” on its population cylinder in the next two 
decades, and overall demographic decline sets in 
by 2040, there will be no way to manage a fair 
deal  within  the  EU,  and  a  global  fair  deal  on 
talent  will  need  to  be  developed.  According  to 
projections  by  Boston  Consulting,  Western 
Europe will need to add 45 million workers to its 
labour  force  by  2030  to  satisfy  future  labour 
demand.  This  equates  approximately  to  the 
current working population of Germany. 
3.  German experiments in attracting 
EU talent 
Matching  labour  supply  and  labour  demand 
remains  a  huge  challenge  for  both  the  private 
and public sector. For example, a pilot project of 
the Chamber of Commerce (IHK) Suhl, Germany 
advertised  25  job  offers  in  Spain  and  received 
roughly  1,000  applications.  Only  11  positions 
were staffed from these efforts according to the 
IHK. Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of 
Crafts  have  emerged  as  the  key  mediators 
between  regions  of  high  unemployment  and 
their own talent shortage regions. 
Some  skills  matching  pilot  projects  focus  on 
young  jobseekers  and  on  apprenticeships  and 
traineeships. An initiative in Chamber of Crafts 
in Frankfurt selected 43 young people from the 
Madrid  region  for  a  trainee  scheme  in 
collaboration  with  employers  in  Hessen.  They 
provided  pre-departure  language  courses  in 
Spain and the general schooling was offered and 
financed  by  the  Chamber  while  the  employers 6 | BUSSE & MOREHOUSE 
 
paid for on-the-job training. The German Federal 
Ministry  of  Economics  funded  the  project  with 
€240,000,  indicating  government  awareness  of 
the challenges at hand. 
Table 1. Responses at the state level to labour 
shortages in Germany 
Bundesland  Strategy to address shortages 
Baden-
Württemberg 
Allianz für Fachkräfte Baden-
Württemberg 
Bayern  6 Säulen Fachkräftestrategie 
Berlin  Masterplan Industriestadt Berlin 
2010 -2020 
Brandenburg  Fachkräftesicherung in 
Brandenburg: Fachkräfte bilden, 
halten und für Brandenburg 
gewinnen! 
Bremen  Fachkräfteinitiative des Landes 
Bremen 
Hamburg  Hamburger Strategie zur Sicherung 
des Fachkräftebedarfs 
Hessen  Gesamtkonzept 
Fachkräftesicherung Hessen 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
Fachkräftesicherung für 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen  Niedersächsischer Pakt für 
Ausbildung und 
Fachkräftenachwuchs 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen  
Fachkräfte sichern! Landesinitiative 
zur Fachkräftesicherung -- 
Nordrhein-Westfalen handelt. 
Rheinland-
Pfalz 
Vereinbarung - Rheinland-Pfalz für 
Ausbildung und 
Fachkräftesicherung  
Saarland  Strategie der Landesregierung zur 
Deckung des Fachkräftebedarfs 
(via Demografie-Netzwerk) 
Sachsen  Fachkräftestrategie Sachsen 2020 
Sachsen-
Anhalt 
Fachkräftesicherungspakt 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
Fachkräfteinitiative “Zukunft im 
Norden” 
Thüringen  Fachkräfteperspektive 2020: 
Chancen nutzen – Potentiale 
erschließen 
Source: Own representation based on Ministries of 
Economics in each Bundesland. 
As shown in Table 1 to the left, the Bundesländer 
(the  German  federal  states)  have  recently 
developed or refined strategies to address labour 
shortages  with  a  wide  set  of  measures.  For 
example,  the  Region  Brandenburg/Berlin 
estimates that 270,000 positions will go unfilled 
by 2015. And these estimates pertain to just two 
of Germany’s 16 federal states. Each Bundesland 
has developed its own strategy oriented to state-
specific  skill  shortages  albeit  addressing  many 
common challenges. 
Often cited measures to ease labour shortages are 
the recognition of foreign credentials, attracting 
foreign  students  to  study  in  their  state  and 
providing  information  on  employment 
opportunities  within  their  states.  Bavaria 
specifically  underlines  targeted  recruitment  of 
high  skilled  workers  abroad  as  one  of  their six 
strategies  to  address  labour  shortages  even 
though they view this pillar, as a tool to thwart 
short-term needs, and only want to recruit from 
abroad  when  the  domestic  labour  supply  has 
been exhausted. 
State and national initiatives have been evolving 
in  parallel.  The  states  of  Bavaria  and  Hessen 
have established websites and welcome centres. 
At  the  same  time,  national  online  platforms  in 
Germany aim to boost talent inflows from other 
EU Member States.  
The  job-of-my-life,  the  BQ-Portal  (part  of  the 
‘Fachkräfte Offensive’), and make-it-in-Germany 
are  notable  initiatives  at  the  national  level. 
German  companies  also  contribute  significantly 
to  supplying  the  platform  Eures  with  job 
advertisements. The Federal Ministry of Labour 
and  Social  Affairs,  in  cooperation  with  the 
German  Federal  Employment  Agency 
(Bundesagentur  für  Arbeit),  via  their  MobiPro 
initiative  has  devoted  €139  million  (between 
2013-2016) to foster European labour mobility. It 
aims to build up Germany’s labour supply and 
buffer  in  part  an  increasingly  difficult  old-age 
dependency  ratio.  The  MobiPro  funding  is  for 
persons  aged  18  to  35  (in exceptional  cases  for 
persons up to age 40). Nevertheless, European or 
national support programs should generally not 
exclude  older  populations.  The  need  for  skills 
matching programs is undeniable, not only in the 
short  run  but  even  more  so  in  view  of  the UNBLOCKING THE LIFELINE OF TALENT | 7 
 
demographic  outlook  in  Europe.  According  to 
the  Fall  DIHK  company  survey  almost  30%  of 
employers  have  not  been  able  to  fill  positions 
within the set timeframe of 2 months. 
4.  The urgency of now and preparing 
for the future 
Mobility  within  Europe  has  been  difficult  to 
achieve  to  date.  There  are  no  legal  barriers  for 
EU citizens moving to Germany. And there are 
no legal barriers for EU talent to leave Germany 
(such as facing uncertain prospect for re-entry). 
When  Europe’s  periphery  recovers  from  the 
economic  crisis,  Germany’s  prospects  of 
attracting  EU  talent  will  likely  diminish 
significantly. Thus, one can expect that EU talent 
will  gravitate  more  evenly  throughout  various 
talent hubs in the EU in the coming decades, as 
the baby boomer exit the labour market. 
Benchmarking  and  understanding  what  moves 
talent around the globe, and reacting to changes 
in  talent  flows  in  real  time  will  become  a 
necessity  for  economic  well-being  for  both 
Germany and the EU. Therefore, the benchmarks 
suggested in this brief to govern a talent mobility 
stabilizer,  could  in  the  long  term,  grow  and 
evolve into a universal tool for creating a global 
fair deal on talent. 
Available data on talent flows suggest that talent 
hubs that can compete for high-skilled workers 
will be open, multicultural cities, while rural or 
less attractive regions (countries) will continue to 
lose  both  the  competition  for  talent  along  with 
the  best  and  brightest  of  their  home-grown 
population. What policymakers must understand 
is  that  both  retaining  and  attracting  talent  will 
increasingly  be  mutually  reinforcing:  if  you 
cannot attract it, you will increasingly not be able 
to retain your own domestic talent. 
In  the  short  term,  Europe  should  add  to  its 
‘toolbox’  for  growing  and  retaining  talent,  as 
well  as  matching  that  talent  with  employment 
opportunities. One way in which the EU and its 
member states can do this is by creating a talent 
mobility  stabilizer  and  related  benchmarking 
tool.  The  evidence  base  created  as a  result  will 
provide useful insights to policy makers to fine-
tune  related  talent  policies.  The  ambivalence 
surrounding the fear of movement and the fear 
of non-movement must be resolved in social and 
political consensus, if EU mobility is to become a 
reality,  strength  and  regional  comparative 
advantage of the European Union. In the longer-
term the EU will have to develop a strategy for a 
global fair deal on talent. It will have to invest in 
growing talent both at home and abroad, as well 
as compete for mature talent globally. 
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